The first mass casualty incident I commanded was sloppy. I was an EMS Supervisor in a district that included a section of Interstate 95 known as “The Slab.” At 05:44 AM, units were dispatched for a commuter bus-versus-passenger van collision in the northbound lanes during the Washington, DC, rush hour. The first arriving engine company reported occupants trapped in the back of a 16-passenger van. The initial assignment was two paramedic-staffed engine companies, a heavy rescue company, one paramedic ambulance, one EMT ambulance, and an EMS Supervisor.
In that era, a battalion chief was not automatically dispatched to multiple patient events. The first-arriving engine officer and EMS Supervisor would handle this crash. With four trapped in the passenger van, “I-95 Command” immediately called for a third engine company and an EMS Task Force. The EMS Task Force is five additional ambulances – at least two are paramedic – and a second EMS Supervisor.
The reality was cruel. Shift change is at 7 am. The responding companies were a mix of A and C shifters. I did not know some of the oncoming A-shift EMS or fire unit supervisors. The recently promoted paramedic ambulance officer I tasked with getting a patient count said he couldn’t provide an accurate number of patients because “… they keep moving.” He estimated that over 60 individuals were involved. Eyeballing the crowd of passengers standing outside the bus, I saw that few appeared injured. Turning to the crumpled passenger van, I observed multiple Fire-EMS crews working to extricate and treat the passengers trapped in the back row.
The second arriving paramedic ambulance was commanded by an officer with years of experience responding to I-95 crashes. He quickly triaged the scene and identified two red tags, five yellow tags, and one black tag (dead). The other 74 individuals were green-tagged. Most of the green tags declined ambulance transportation after initial assessment.
With all hands engaged, “I-95 command” called for two medivac helicopters, two more fire suppression companies (for a total of six), three additional EMT ambulances1, and a battalion chief. The Operations Division Chief added to the call and was the first chief on scene.
The Operations Division Chief walked to my buggy and asked who the Transportation Officer was … oops … no one was assigned. The second EMS Supervisor, who would usually be assigned to Treatment and Transport, was assigned to the Extrication Sector at the van. The Ops Chief said, “Mike, I am not hearing sirens.” The Chief was right; no Transportation Sector supervisor was there to get the ambulances moving.

Lincoln EW, Freeman CL, Strecker-McGraw MK. (2023, May 16). EMS Incident Command,
While the red tags were quickly flown to a trauma center, it took another 20 minutes to get ambulances headed to hospitals. Issues included telling crews to get rolling while they were providing secondary treatments to the patient in the back of the ambulance and tracking down the firefighters who drove the ambulances to the scene. The transportation company that ran the bus service sent an empty bus to transport all of the green tag patients that declined transport to the Pentagon and downtown Washington, DC.
The division chief’s on-scene hot wash2 as the event wound down was comprehensive. This was a “growth experience” for me. Let’s look at Phoenix and Chicago operations for perspective.
Get Enough Command-Level Managers On The Scene
Phoenix Fire Department Assistant Chief Stephen Kries presented a seminar after the year-long recovery process from the Bret Tarver 2001 Southwest Supermarket line-of-duty-death (LODD). Flying back from the January 2003 Change in The Fire Service Symposium in Phoenix I wrote up my notes that included:
The recovery process also looked at the utilization of company and command officers on the fireground. A company officer’s core competency is to command a fire company. A core chief officer’s competency is to command fire companies. This is a function of the fire department’s hierarchical structure, not personality.
For example, a captain filling in as a battalion chief does a better job as a West Sector officer than she would have if she was commanding Engine 2 AND in charge of West Sector. At the sector level of the incident management system, company officers are required to wear two hats. There are too many levels of tasks.
Phoenix recommends sending more command officers to a fire event to serve as sector and division commanders, allowing company officers to command their companies. It is a waste of talent and experience to allow command officers to stay in their fire stations while a low-frequency, high-risk event like a structure fire is occurring in the city.
The third edition of Fire Command covers incident command organization for medical, extrication, treatment, and transportation (Brunacini & Brunacini, 2026, pp. 180-181)

Applying the Lessons Learned
Reflecting back on this I-95 crash, the takeaways include quickly filling the Treatment and Transportation ICS positions, keeping ambulance transport crews intact – or assuring that every ambulance has a chauffeur, and getting a chief officer to the incident.
I analyzed time on task for a dozen mass casualty3 incidents my department handled. The time from arrival on scene to ambulances transporting to the hospital averaged 14 minutes faster when a battalion chief arrived with the first alarm assignment. The longest time-on-task from arrival to ambulance transport was at mass casualty events where no fire command officer attended the incident.
I spent time with the paramedic ambulance officers who regularly run “The Slab” to identify the best way to assess, treat, and transport when we have crashes with more than six patients on the interstate. We run crashes every day on the interstate, with zero to three patients. Routine procedures for those incidents don’t work well for mass-casualty events.
Five months later, we responded to a multi-vehicle, high-speed crash in the southbound lanes of I-95 on a Saturday afternoon. The first arriving paramedic ambulance reported a multiple-patient event with occupants pinned and called for an EMS Task Force. I called for a battalion chief and two additional suppression companies to respond. Two red-tag and five yellow-tag patients were hospital-bound in half the time compared to the earlier incident.
Chicago EMS Level I, II, and III Plans
The Chicago Fire Department has three levels of EMS response; each level includes five ambulances and an escalating group of command and support resources.
EMS Level I
- 5 additional ambulances
- 1 ALS (paramedic) engine or truck company
- 1 Paramedic Field Chief (EMS Supervisor)
- 1 Battalion Chief
- 1 Assistant Deputy Chief Paramedic
EMS Level II
- 5 additional ambulances for a total of 10
- 1 triage van
- 1 command van (picture shows District 4 Mobile Command Post 2-7-4)
- Media affairs
- 1 Paramedic Field Chief
- 1 Deputy Chief Paramedic
- 1 Deputy District Chief

EMS Level III
- 5 additional ambulances for a total of 15
- 1 District Chief
- 1 Assistant Deputy Chief Fire Commissioner (EMS) – [Chief Paramedic]
- 1 On-Call Physician
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1 This incident was before we got the medical ambulance bus after the 9/11 attack.
2 Hot Wash: Meeting of the command staff and company officers once an event is declared stable but before the companies leave the scene. This reviews the actions taken, the challenges encountered, and whether the owner, fire chief, or others need immediate feedback.
3 Mass casualty is defined as six or more patients transported.
Elements, identifiers, and sequence of events may be altered in “war stories” to protect the innocent or work better as an example.
References
Brunacini, A. V. & Brunacini, N. (2026) Fire Command, Third Edition. Across The Street Productions. ISBN 979-8-234-05741-9.
DeNolf RL, Kahwaji CI. (2022 Oct 10). EMS Mass Casualty Management. In: StatPearls [Internet]. Treasure Island (FL): StatPearls Publishing; 2026 Jan. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK482373/
Kreis, S. (2003, December 1) Rapid Intervention Isn’t Rapid. Fire Engineering Magazine. https://www.fireengineering.com/firefighting/rapid-intervention-isnt-rapid/
Lincoln EW, Freeman CL, Strecker-McGraw MK. (2023, May 16). EMS Incident Command. In: StatPearls [Internet]. Treasure Island (FL): StatPearls Publishing; 2026 Jan. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK534800/