The aftermath of the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting on the Orlando Fire Department has been challenging. Last month included an after-action report by the National Police Foundation that was requested by the department. This 43-page report focused on the leadership, command, and control aspects of the event and aftermath.
A few of their findings:
- Due to a combination of circumstances, Fire Department executive leadership did not know of the incident until approximately three hours after it began.
- There was no unified command and poor inter-agency communication.
- Employees at all levels were either unaware of policies and procedures or actively chose not to follow them as they believed them to be outdated.
- Policies and procedures were not consistent with training.
The after-action report has implications for every department that has the possibility of a no-notice, catastrophic event requiring extensive coordination and resources.
The Difficulty of Multiple Urgencies
ProPublica’s Abe Aboraya looked into the issue of purchased but unused ballistic vests and a fire department active shooter protocol that was incomplete and in development for three years.
Frank Straub, one of the National Police Foundation after-action report authors, observed: “The threat is constantly evolving and changing,” Straub said. “Our method of responding has to constantly evolve and change. That was an issue in Orlando.”
The fire department conducted active shooter training, but the policies and operating procedure had not changed. At the Pulse nightclub at 2 am on June 17, 2016, fire department responders were not clear if they were to operate in the warm zone or wait in the cold zone for an all-clear. They decided to wait.
Assistant Fire Chief Anibal Saez started to implement an active shooter policy in 2013, including a purchase of 20 ballistic vests, Tactical Emergency Casualty Care bleeding control and chest decompression supplies. These items were in storage when the Pulse incident occurred. A new fire chief in 2015 resulted in command-level project assignment changes.
Reading the timeline in How the Orlando Fire Department’s Active Shooter Policy Fell Through the Cracks. I recognized bureaucratic and tribal issues making this active shooter initiative move so slowly. Some of you may recognize the drip-drip-drip of glacial forward motion in the face of changing priorities in your department.
5 Elements for Timely Initiative Implementation
Part of the challenge is that there are many issues that deserve time and resources but the department does not have enough of either to meet every initiative’s goal. In addition, there is lethargy on initiatives that are not of interest to the chief fire executives.
Successful fire department initiatives often occur as a reaction to a bad outcome event or high-profile near miss. Those initiatives have 5 elements of success:
- Sense of urgency
- Support of the executive fire officer team
- A clear vision of the end product, policy or activity
- Community support
- Firefighter interest
A near-miss example is accountability tags in the metropolitan Washington DC region. Discussed for a long while, the tags and accountability protocol became a priority after a judge allowed the spouses and the estates of firefighters killed in a structure fire to directly sue Seattle Fire Department executive and administrative fire officers for $55 million worth of personal liability for failing to completely implement a fireground accountability program.
Seattle lost six firefighters operating within structure fires between 1987 and 1995. Some were unnoticed by the incident commander for a long time period. Those events, along with prior Washington State OSHA findings, are the considerations that lead to the judge’s decision to allow individual fire officers to be sued. After learning about this development during a presentation by a Seattle command-level officer, the Washington DC area fire chiefs could vividly see the possibility of personal liability for failure to have an accountability system in place. It created a palpable sense of urgency.
Examples of rapid implementation after a bad outcome event include Los Angeles County Chief Keith Klinger after the 1961 Bel Air brush fire that destroyed 484 homes and Arlington County Chief Edward Plaugher after the 2001 attack on the Pentagon. Both chiefs had well-developed multiple year action plans that included elements that were rejected in earlier implementation attempts. For Chief Plaugher, it meant four-person staffing for every fire company.
Company Commander Initiative Tips
John Daly recommends making your ideas matter by determining What’s In It For Them (WIIFT) for every decision maker you encounter along your advocacy path.
Good WIIFTs help decision makers justify their choices. When people contemplate adopting an idea, they mentally calculate what they will gain from the proposal compared to what it will cost to adopt it. If the ratio is positive, they buy in; if it is neutral or negative, they hesitate.
Remember that your WIIFTs are not necessarily their WIIFT. In addition to determining each decision maker’s WIIFT, Daly describes creating persuasive messages using one of these techniques:
- Prove the idea by using good evidence
- Scare the decision maker appropriately
- Organize the message for optimal impact
Details are in Daly’s book Advocacy: Championing Ideas and Influencing Others.
The 2018 mid-term elections provided some initiative/advocacy examples:
Houston Proposition B passed for firefighter pay equity with police. The long and politically ugly battle continues with the mayor and some members of the city council.
California Proposition 11 passed. Allowed private ambulance owners to require crews to remain on-call during meal breaks and be paid at their regular rate. AMR was the biggest advocate for Proposition 11, contributing 99.9% of the $30.11 million used by the “Californians for Emergency Preparedness and Safety.” This effort was to offset the California Supreme Court ruling in Augustus v. ABM Security Services. According to the court, state labor law mandates that rest breaks must be considered off-duty and uninterruptible, including in the event of an emergency.
Marion County, West Virginia, volunteer fire department levy fails by less than 1 percent. The levy was to provide $780,000 in additional annual funding to the 13 volunteer fire departments. Required 60% of the voters to approve, received 59.21% There were 11,318 yes votes, needed 156 more votes to get to 60%.
Career Ocean City (Maryland) firefighters and paramedics change town charter to use binding interest arbitration. They join the town police department that achieved binding interest arbitration in 2003. This initiative arose in part due to a unilateral change in career work schedules forced into the 2016 labor agreement and implemented in 2018.
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Daly, PH, Watkins, M with Reavis, C. (2006) The First 90 Days in Government: Critical Success Strategies for New Public Managers at All Levels. Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing.
Daly, John A, (2011) Advocacy: Championing Ideas and Influencing Others. New Haven: Yale University Press
Straub, F, Zeuinik, J and Gorban, B (2017 May) “Lessons Learned from the Police Response to the San Bernardino and Orlando Terrorist Attacks. ” CTC Sentinel (10)5, 1-7
Aboraya, Abe (2018 September 26) How the Orlando Fire Department’s Active Shooter Policy Fell Through the Cracks. WMFE and ProPublica.
Aboraya, Abe (2018 September 26) Orlando Paramedics Didn’t Go In to Save Victims of the Pulse Shooting. Here’s Why. WMFE and ProPublica.
Straub F., Jennings, C. and Gorban, B. (2018 October) After-Action Review of the Orlando Fire Department Response to the Attack at the Pulse Nightclub Washington DC: National Police Foundation.
Aboraya, Abe (2018 November 16) Outside Review Faults Orlando Fire Department Policies and Mistakes in Pulse Shooting Response. WMFE and ProPublica.
Featured image from CNN