Firefighters are familiar with the Catastrophic Theory of Reform, the idea that significant societal or systemic change is most likely to occur following a major crisis or disaster.
Catastrophic reform drive changes to the fire prevention code: public assembly exits and interior finishes after the 1942 Cocoanut Grove nightclub fire in Boston, smoke/heat control through compartmentalization/fire doors and automatic detection in schools after the 1958 Our Lady of the Angels school fire in Chicago, sprinklers required in highrise buildings after the 1980 MGM Grand fire in Las Vegas, and pyrotechnics restrictions, interior finishes and exit signage after the 2003 Station Nightclub fire in Providence, Rhode Island.
The window of opportunity for reform is influenced by:
- Discrediting existing institutions and elites
- Weakening opposition to change
- Creating urgent pressure for solutions
- Shifting public expectations and demands
- Making previously “impossible” options seem necessary
Los Angeles fire operations are no strangers to catastrophic reform. Fire Chief Keith Klinger went to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to report during the 1961 Bel Air-Brentwood wildfire. When the supervisors asked what should be done in the future, Chief Klinger immediately provided a comprehensive plan. Most plan elements had been proposed before and rejected by the board. Approvals were made at the height of the Bel Air incident.
In the early 2000s, residents and business owners in the San Fernando Valley felt that their city taxes were going downtown and not providing service to the valley. ValleyVOTE was an effort to secede from Los Angeles City. Inadequate rescue ambulance service was one of the issues, and some high-profile bad outcomes occurred.
Mayor James Hahn directed Fire Chief William Bamattre to “fix it.” This multi-year response increased the rescue ambulance fleet by 40% and put a paramedic asset (single-role paramedic or paramedic/firefighter) in every fire station.
… MAY BE A FIRE EQUIVALENT TO A CATEGORY 5 HURRICANE
That’s Stephen Pyne’s assessment. In 2019, fire historian Stephen Pyne and wildfire expert Jack Cohen spent three days touring Pacific Palisades and participating in the NFPA’s “Assessing Structure Ignition Potential from Wildfire” training with LAFD’s Defensible Space Program members and homeowners.
Cohen makes these observations of the 2025 fire:
When you study the destruction in Pacific Palisades and Altadena, note what didn’t burn — unconsumed tree canopies adjacent to totally destroyed homes. The sequence of destruction is commonly assumed to occur in some kind of organized spreading flame front — a tsunami of super-heated gases — but it doesn’t happen that way.
In high-density development, scattered burning homes spread to their neighbors and so on. Ignitions downwind and across streets are typically from showers of burning embers from burning structures.
This fundamental misunderstanding has likewise led to a misunderstanding of prevention. No longer is it a matter of preventing wildfires but instead preventing points of ignition within communities by employing “home-hardening” strategies — proper landscaping, fire-resistant siding — and enjoining neighbors in collective efforts such as brush clearing. (Curwen 2025)
Will the replacement homes look like this house that used wildfire home hardening techniques and survived the Palisades fire?
HOW LARGE OF A FIREFIGHTER STANDING ARMY CAN THE COMMUNITY AFFORD?
When the National Weather Service issued its “Life-Threatening & Destructive Windstorm” alert on Monday, LAFD called in 90 additional firefighters to staff units and predeployed nine fire companies to vulnerable areas. Los Angeles County moved 30 extra engine companies into the area with 100 overtime firefighters. The U.S. Forest Service moved resources closer. It is the pre-planned response for a “Red Flag” alert. (Fuller, et al. 2025)
The Tuesday Santa Ana wind gusts of 85 to 100 miles an hour grounded firefighting airplanes and helicopters. The Palisades fire started at 10:35 am. Strike teams from Ventura and Orange Counties were mobilized. The high winds accelerated the fire spread in the high-density community described by Cohen as “… scattered burning homes spread to their neighbors and so on. Ignitions downwind and across streets are typically from showers of burning embers from burning structures.”
Many residents were forced to flee their homes. The fire was spreading faster than the traffic, resulting in cars abandoned on gridlocked roads – most without keys. The fire department used a dozer to clear the road for responding fire companies.
While all hands were engaged at the Palisades fire, a second major fire started in Eaton Canyon in the Altadena community at 6:18 pm.
Around 9 pm Los Angeles County Fire Chief Anthony Marrone called the California Office of Emergency Services and requested 50 strike teams: 250 engine companies staffed with 1,000 firefighters
At 9:26 pm. LAFD was calling back all available staff to fire stations and the maintenance shop.
By midnight, crews were losing water pressure from the hydrants. The water system was not designed to deliver 400% of its rated capacity. The power shutdown also affected the water pumps supplying Altadena.
A rough 13.5 hours. By Wednesday night they had:
7,500+ Personnel
1,162 Fire Engines
23 Water Tenders
6 Air Tankers
31 Helicopters
53 Dozers
By Sunday night, there were over 15,000 personnel, 2.500 California National Guard troops, 1,390 fire engines, 80 aircraft, 160 water tenders, and 170 dozers.
THE COST OF PREPARATiON
Redondo Beach Fire Chief Patrick Butler, a retired LAFD assistant chief, explained the issue of red-flag alert predeployments. It is expensive to call back staff and put additional units in service. Chief Butler points out that he was in 30 large-scale predeployments, with just three of those deployments handling significant work. From Chief Butler’s perspective, it is worth the cost.
What levels of firefighter staffing does the community want to pay for?
In July 2023, the National Institute of Standards and Technology released a case study of the 2018 Camp Fire in Butte County. At that time, the Camp Fire was the most deadly and destructive California wildland fire, killing 85, destroying 18,00 structures, and triggering the evacuation of 40,000 people.
As Los Angeles rebuilds, what type of community engineering (roads, building codes, landscaping, and fire breaks) and brush fire abatement will they implement to reduce the fire spread risk and the cost of fire department preparation?
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Curwen, Thomas (2025 January 11) Inconvenient truths about the fires burning in Los Angeles from two fire experts. Los Angeles Times. Accessed Jan 12, 2025 https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-01-11/fire-experts-asses-los-angeles-blazes-amid-changing-times
Fuller, Thomas; Berzon, Alexandra; Browning, Kellen; and Hubler, Shawn (2025 Jan 11) L.A. Was Prepared for Serious Fires. But It Wasn’t Ready for Four. The New York Times. Accessed Jan 12, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/11/us/los-angeles-calfire-firefighters.html
Maranghides, Alexander; Link, Eric D.; Mell. William “Ruddy,”; Hawks, Steven, Brown, Chrisopher; and Walton, William D, (2023 July) NIST Technical Note 2252: A Case Study of the Camp Fire: Notification, Evacuation, Traffic, and Temporary Refuge Areas. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institutes of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.2252